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SUMMARY
For the first time since 1975 (the year Canada’s marginal effective tax rates were first
measured), Canada has become the most tax-competitive country among G-7 states
with respect to taxation of capital investment. Even more remarkably, Canada
accomplished this feat within a mere six years, having previously been the least tax-
competitive G-7 member. Even in comparison to strongly growing emerging economies,
Canada’s 2010 marginal effective tax rate on capital is still above average.
The planned reductions in federal and provincial corporate taxes by 2013 will reduce
Canada’s effective tax rate on new investments to 18.4 percent, below the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2010 average and close to the
average of the 50 non-OECD countries studied. This remarkable change in Canada’s tax
competitiveness must be maintained in the coming years, as countries are continually
reducing their business taxation despite the recent fiscal pressures arising from the
2008-9 downturn in the world economy. Many countries have forged ahead with
significant reforms designed to increase tax competitiveness and improve tax neutrality
including Greece, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and the United Kingdom.
The continuing bias in Canada’s corporate income tax structure favouring
manufacturing and processing business warrants close scrutiny. Measured by the
difference between the marginal effective tax rate on capital between manufacturing
and the broad range of service sectors, Canada has the greatest gap in tax burdens
between manufacturing and services among OECD countries. Surprisingly, preferential
tax treatment (such as fast write-off and investment tax credits) favouring only
manufacturing and processing activities has become the norm in Canada, although it
does not exist in most developed economies.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Canada stood out on the global stage for the “good policies and regulations it has
undertaken over the past two decades.”1 Among these policies, a decade-long tax reform bore
the most measurable fruit in 2010; for the first time since 1975 (the year Canada’s marginal
effective tax rates were first measured 2), Canada became the most tax-competitive country
among G-7 states with respect to taxation of capital investment. Even more remarkably,
Canada accomplished this feat within a mere six years, having previously been the least
competitive G-7 country in taxing capital investment. More specifically, Canada’s marginal
effective tax rate on capital investment almost halved, coming down to 20.5 percent in 2010
from 39 percent in 2005. The corresponding G-7 average is 28.2 percent in 2010 (versus
33.6 percent in 2005) while those of the OECD and the 83 countries covered in our study are
18.6 percent and 17.7 percent respectively (versus 22 percent and 20.4 percent in 2005).
Accordingly, Canada’s ranking in business tax competitiveness has moved up 12 ranks among
the 33 OECD member countries and 24 among all 83 nations we examined. 
As we reported earlier3, the planned reductions in federal and provincial corporate taxes by
2013 will reduce Canada’s effective tax rate on new investments to 18.4 percent, which will
move below the 2010 OECD average and close to the average of all 83 studied countries. This
remarkable change in Canada’s tax competitiveness from one of the worst to a near-average
position must be maintained in the coming years as countries are continually reducing their
business taxation despite the recent fiscal pressures arising from the 2008-9 downturn in the
world economy.   
For instance, the Japanese government announced a five-point reduction in corporate income
tax for April 1 along with a major reform of its corporate tax on foreign earnings of Japanese
companies. Should Japan proceed, the United States will have the highest corporate income
tax rate among OECD countries. The United Kingdom announced it will reduce its corporate
income tax rate by a further four points to 24 percent by 2014 (tax revenues losses have been
booked in the Exchequer’s budget), even below the 25.6 percent rate that is legislated by
Canada by 2012. Australia is also reducing its corporate tax rate by one point from 30 to
29 percent. Other countries – the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Israel, Singapore and
Slovenia – are also continuing to reduce their corporate income tax rates.
On the other hand, as the economic recovery remains weak and government budget deficits
explode, tax competitiveness has become a lesser concern in some countries. Several
(i.e., Mexico and Portugal) even raised their company income tax rates in 2010 as a result of
concerns about revenues. By and large however, increases in personal income and consumption
taxes, rather than corporate taxes, have been preferred by most countries to address revenue
concerns.
1 Wendy Dobson and Diana Kuzmanovic, 2010, “Differentiating Canada: The Future of the Canada-US Relationship,”
SPP Research Papers, Vol 3, Issue 7, November 2010.
2 McKenzie, Kenneth J., and Jack M. Mintz, 1992, “Tax Effects on the Cost of Capital,” in Canada-U.S. Tax
Comparisons, NBER, The University of Chicago Press.
3 Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz, “Federal-Provincial Business Tax Reforms: A Growth Agenda with Competitive Rates
and Neutral Treatment of Business Activities,” SPP Research Papers, Volume 4, Issue 1, School of Public Policy,
University of Calgary, January 2011.
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Some countries have forged ahead with significant reforms designed to increase tax
competitiveness. For example, New Zealand brought out its most comprehensive tax reform in
25 years, including rate-reduction and base-broadening measures that improve neutrality
(although the effective tax rate does increase)4. Taiwan cut its corporate income tax rate twice
in 2010 from the previous 25 percent to the current 17 percent, joining ranks with the most tax-
competitive economies in Asia (i.e., Hong Kong and Singapore). Greece, under unprecedented
fiscal pressure, will stick to the previously planned reduction in its corporate income tax rate
from 25 percent to 20 percent by 2014. France also reformed its local business tax and slightly
reduced the maximum rate for this tax. All these reforms have set the bar higher in tax
competitiveness for capital investment, leaving Canada no reason to be complacent about its
accomplishments in business tax reform. 
Moreover, the stubborn bias in Canada’s corporate income tax structure favouring
manufacturing and processing business warrants close scrutiny. Measured by the difference
between the marginal effective tax rate on capital (METR) between manufacturing and the
broad range of service sectors, Canada has the greatest tax gap between manufacturing and
services among OECD countries. Our preliminary analysis suggests that METRs, among other
economic variables, do significantly impact foreign direct investment flows and therefore are
meaningful to economies like Canada.5 Surprisingly, preferential tax treatment (such as fast
write-off and investment tax credit) favouring only manufacturing and processing activities has
become the norm in Canada, although it does not exist in most developed economies. 
Equally alarming is the renewed debate on the merit of reducing the corporate income tax in
light of the current wave of financial crises and government deficits. In Canada, the opposition
parties have objected to the corporate income tax rate reductions, arguing that revenues from
higher corporate tax rates should be used for other priorities. However, the Irish government
successfully struggled, in its bailout negotiations with the European Union and International
Monetary Fund (IMF), to preserve its famously low corporate income tax rate of 12.5 percent
and we believe that, even during an economic downturn, a sound and sustainable tax policy is
superior to any short-term stimulus produced through temporary tax subsidies that simply
borrow from future planned investments. 
4 Tax Notes International, “New Zealand: 2010 Budget Brings Biggest Tax Changes in 25 Years,” June 7, 2010.
5 Using statistical analysis, we have examined whether our measured effective tax rates have an effect on foreign direct
investment flows among countries during 2005-2008. Taking into account other factors that influence investment
(inflation, political risk, GDP per capita, trade protection, human development and the exchange rate), we have found
that a one percentage point increase in the effective tax rate on new investment causes foreign direct investment
flows as a share of GDP to decline between 0.05 to 0.08 percentage points. Given that the mean average of foreign
direct investment to GDP is about 5.2 percent, this reduction is substantial. A preliminary analysis is provided in
M. Krzepkowski, J. Mintz and J-F Wen, mimeograph, University of Calgary, 2010.
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WHY IS REDUCING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE PREFERABLE TO KEEPING
IT HIGH?
A decade-long business tax reform in Canada reduced our combined federal and provincial
corporate income tax rate from 43 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2010. After the latest
1.5-percentage point rate reduction, the federal government’s plan is to further reduce the
federal corporate income tax rate by another 1.5 percentage points which, combined with
provincial cuts, is expected to bring down the combined corporate income tax rate to close to
25 percent by 2012.  Since this tax rate reduction for large and medium-sized corporations was
initiated and implemented by the previous Liberal government and advanced by the current
Conservative government, there has clearly been a strong political consensus that reducing the
corporate income tax rate is good for the economy and public finances. However, a recession-
induced government deficit has unfortunately become a rationale for arguments in favour of
shelving the unfinished income tax rate reduction for business.  
Such a break from the previous consensus goes against not only established economic wisdom
but also recent findings, both of which support taxing corporate income as lightly as possible
(albeit on a tax base as broad as possible, which is a strategy we shall discuss subsequently). It
also creates political uncertainty, hurting prospects for economic growth and Canada’s well-
earned reputation as a country that welcomes investment and jobs.
Taxing corporate income is justified essentially as an administrative means of reinforcing the
personal income tax system, taxing business income accruing to non-residents on Canadian
operations and serving as a quasi-user fee for public services of direct benefit to businesses6.
That is, corporate income taxation serves mainly as an administrative tool to reinforce revenue
collection from the various stakeholders in corporations. 
Considering the efficiency characteristics of all taxes, income (and capital-based) taxes on
corporations have the greatest negative effects on the allocation of capital investment and
business operations which directly link to job creation, economic growth and revenue
collection by government. In other words, among the major tax categories (including income-
based, consumption-based and property-based taxes), corporate income taxes are the most
distortive and hence the most harmful type of tax for economic growth7. Furthermore, when
viewing tax incidence in a small open economy like Canada, “the much greater mobility of
capital than labour means that a significant part of corporate income tax is borne by domestic
workers.”8 Therefore, taxing corporate income at a rate higher than the international norm
(i.e., around 25 percent) will ultimately harm overall revenue collection by driving away
mobile capital investment from Canada, negatively impacting employment. 
6 Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, December 1997, available at
http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/1998/brie_-eng.asp page 2.8.
7 OECD (03 Nov 2010), Tax Policy Reform and Economic Growth, “Executive Summary,” page 10.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/49/46617652.pdf.  
8 OECD (December 2010), Tax Policy Brief: Tax Policy Reform and Fiscal Consolidation, page 2.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/12/46600079.pdf. Also see Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010, Tax by Design:
The Mirrlees Review (www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview) for more detailed analysis. 
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Given the direct revenue impact of the corporate income tax rate, it has been proven that a tax
rate higher than the international norm, which is around 25 percent, tends to reduce the
domestic tax base through income-shifting means such as transfer pricing within multinational
companies. Such income shifting prevents tax revenue from growing in tandem with the tax
rate. Since Canada’s 2010 corporate income tax rate is still higher than the international norm,
we should not expect that keeping our corporate income tax rate at 29 percent in 2010
(28 percent after the latest federal rate reduction in 2011) would necessarily bring in more
revenue9. 
In light of the above arguments, we believe that sticking to the existing government plan to
lower our corporate tax rate to close to 25 percent is crucial to growing our economy and
balancing our budget. When there is an apparent conflict between gaining tax competitiveness
and balancing the budget, it is helpful to focus on the effects of taxes on long-term economic
growth and to think globally. Thus, lowering the corporate income tax rate to boost capital
investment is good for long-term economic growth, which in turn provides assurance for
revenue collection that helps balance the budget.
THE MOVING AVERAGE OF TAX COMPETITIVENESS: AN UPDATE FOR 2010
In our previous report, we assembled a table10 showing the moving average of tax
competitiveness among various groups of countries around the world and Canada’s
corresponding rankings for the consecutive years from 2005 to 2009. We updated this table to
2010, as Table 1 in the current report. In addition to incorporating tax changes made by some
countries for 2010, we also updated some non-tax data including real interest rates, capital
weights by industry and asset type and country-specific inflation rates. As a result, not only are
the data for 2010 different from 2009, but some numbers for pre-2010 years have changed
slightly from those in our previous report. The OECD expansion from 30 countries to 3411 and
the expansion of our complete list of countries studied from 80 to 83 also affect the group
averages for the pre-2010 years. 
9 See, for example, Kimberly Clausing, “Corporate Tax Revenues in OECD Countries,” International Tax and Public
Finance 14 (2, 2007): 115-134; Jack Mintz, “2007 Tax Competitiveness Report: A Call for Comprehensive Tax
Reform,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 254 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, September 2007); and Alex Brill,
“Corporate Tax Rates: Receipts and Distortions,” Tax Notes, 22 December, 2008.
10 Chen, Duanjie and Jack Mintz, 2010, “Canada’s Tax Competitiveness After a Decade of Reforms: Still an Unfinished
Plan,” SPP Briefing Papers, Volume 3, Issue 5, May 2010, Table 2. 
11 The latest addition is Estonia, which will be included in our future study of tax competitiveness.
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TABLE 1: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, Various Country Groups, 2005 - 2010a
NOTES:  Canada’s marginal effective tax rate on capital in 2013 will be 18.4 percent.
a. The pre-2010 numbers may differ from our previous report mainly because of our expansion of OECD countries (from
30 to 33 countries) and our total country coverage (from 80 to 83 countries). Our switch from other sources to the OECD
tax database for the statutory company income tax rates and updating non-tax parameters also made a difference to the
calculations. 
b. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
As summarized in Table 1 and detailed in Tables 2 and 3, Canada has had the third-fastest pace
in advancing its ranking in tax competitiveness among the various groups of countries reviewed
in this report12. Within the period 2005-10, Canada’s overall METR dropped by nearly half from
39 to 20.5 percent, which was mainly attributable to corporate income tax reduction, provincial
sales tax harmonization with the GST in Ontario and British Columbia and the almost complete
elimination of capital taxes13. 
12 The largest change in ranking is Belgium followed by China. However, the speedy METR drop in these two countries
is not related to any statutory tax rate reduction but to the notional interest deduction introduced in Belgium for equity
financing and the sales tax reform instituted in China that eliminated VAT on machinery purchases.
13 Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz, “Federal-Provincial Business Tax Reforms: A Growth Agenda with Competitive Rates
and Neutral Treatment of Business Activities,” SPP Research Papers, Volume 4, Issue 1, School of Public Policy,
University of Calgary, January 2011.
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Canada 20.5 28.0 28.9 31.6 36.2 39.0 29.3 34.3 - 5.0 n/a
G-7 28.2 29.5 29.6 32.3 33.1 33.6 32.4 36.3 - 3.9 5
OECD (33) 18.6 18.9 19.1 20.1 20.6 22.0 25.7 28.4 - 2.7 21
BRIC 29.3 29.3 36.9 36.9 36.8 38.1 28.2 29.4 -1.2 2
Non-OECD (50) 17.0 17.3 18.2 18.5 18.8 19.3 25.5 27.8 -2.3 20
ALL 83 COUNTRIES 17.7 17.9 18.6 19.2 19.5 20.4 25.6 28.1 -2.5 43
Canada’s ranking by METR within various groups of countries, in descending order
G7 7 4 4 5 1 1
OECD 13 5 5 7 1 1
ALL 83 COUNTRIES 28 10 12 13 4 4
Marginal Effective Tax Rate Statutory Company Income Tax Rate
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2010 2005 Change # of countries
in % that cut general
pointsb corporate tax rates
TABLE 2: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, OECD Countries, 2005 - 2010
* By 2013, Canada’s METR will decline to 18.4 percent, placing it below Denmark. 
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US 34.6 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.3 35.3 38.2 39.0 -0.8
France 34.0 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.4 34.4 34.9 -0.5
Japan 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 39.5 39.5 0.0
Korea 29.5 29.5 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 24.2 27.5 -3.3
UK 27.9 27.9 27.9 29.4 29.4 29.4 28.0 30.0 -2.0
Italy 26.9 26.9 26.9 32.1 32.1 32.1 27.5 37.3 -9.8
Australia 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 30.0 30.0 0.0
Spain 25.4 25.4 25.4 27.5 29.6 29.6 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Austria 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.0 25.0 0.0
Norway 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 28.0 28.0 0.0
Germany 23.8 23.8 23.8 33.1 33.1 33.1 30.2 38.9 -8.7
Portugal 20.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 19.6 19.6 29.0 27.5 1.5
Canada 20.5 28.0 28.9 31.6 36.2 39.0 29.3 34.3 -5.0
Sweden 18.9 18.9 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 26.3 28.0 -1.7
Denmark 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 21.0 21.0 25.0 30.0 -5.0
Finland 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 26.0 26.0 0.0
Switzerland 17.6 17.6 17.6 18.1 18.1 18.1 21.2 21.3 -0.1
New Zealand 17.6 17.6 17.6 19.8 19.8 19.8 30.0 33.0 -3.0
Mexico 17.5 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.8 17.5 30.0 30.0 0.0
Netherlands 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 19.9 21.4 25.5 31.5 -6.0
Luxembourg 16.8 16.8 18.4 19.3 19.3 19.8 28.6 30.4 -1.8
Hungary 15.9 16.4 16.4 16.4 15.1 14.5 19.0 16.0 3.0
Israel 14.6 15.3 16.0 17.4 18.9 18.9 25.0 31.0 -6.0
Poland 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 19.0 19.0 0.0
Greece 13.0 13.5 13.5 13.5 15.6 17.4 24.0 32.0 -8.0
Czech Rep 12.0 12.7 13.5 15.6 15.6 17.1 19.0 26.0 -7.0
Slovenia 11.6 12.3 13.0 13.7 14.4 15.1 20.0 25.0 -5.0
Slovak Republic 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 19.0 19.0 0.0
Ireland 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 12.5 12.5 0.0
Iceland 8.9 8.9 8.9 10.8 10.8 16.9 15.0 18.0 -3.0
Chile 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.3 17.0 17.0 0.0
Turkey 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 10.7 20.0 30.0 -10.0
Belgium -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 23.0 34.0 34.0 0.0
SIMPLE AVERAGE 18.6 18.6 18.9 20.1 20.6 22.0 25.7 28.4 -2.6
Marginal Effective Tax Rate Reference: Statutory Company 
Income Tax Rate
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2010 2005 Change in
% points 
TABLE 3: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment in 83 Countries, 2010 vs. 2005
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Argentina 43.1 48.7 41.8 6.9 43.1 48.7 41.8 6.9 1 2 35.0 35.0
Chad 36.3 40.1 35.3 4.8 40.0 44.0 38.9 5.1 2 3 40.0 45.0 -5.0
Brazil 35.1 33.7 35.2 -1.5 35.1 33.7 35.2 -1.5 3 11 34.0 34.0
Uzbekistan 34.9 38.9 33.5 5.4 35.4 39.7 33.9 5.8 4 7 17.2 19.0 -1.8
US 34.6 32.7 36.2 -3.5 35.3 34.5 36.3 -1.8 5 9 38.2 39.0 -0.8
France 34.0 35.6 33.6 2.0 35.4 37.0 35.1 1.9 6 8 34.4 34.9 -0.5
India 33.6 28.8 35.4 -6.6 36.3 31.4 38.1 -6.7 7 6 34.0 36.6 -2.6
Russia 31.9 33.3 31.4 1.9 37.2 38.9 36.7 2.2 8 5 20.0 22.0 -2.0
Japan 29.5 29.4 29.6 -0.2 29.5 29.4 29.6 -0.2 9 16 39.5 39.5
Korea 29.5 31.9 28.6 3.3 32.2 34.7 31.2 3.5 10 13 24.2 27.5 -3.3
UK 27.9 27.7 27.9 -0.2 29.4 26.7 30.0 -3.3 11 17 28.0 30.0 -2.0
Italy 26.9 25.1 27.4 -2.3 32.1 30.1 32.6 -2.5 12 14 27.5 37.3 -9.8
Australia 26.0 27.6 25.7 1.9 26.0 27.6 25.7 1.9 13 19 30.0 30.0
Spain 25.4 24.3 25.6 -1.3 29.6 28.4 29.8 -1.4 14 15 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Lesotho 25.3 13.7 28.6 -14.9 35.1 20.1 39.4 -19.3 15 10 25.0 35.0 -10.0
Austria 25.3 25.1 25.3 -0.2 25.3 25.1 25.3 -0.2 16 21 25.0 25.0
Costa Rica 25.2 35.3 25.0 10.3 25.2 35.3 25.0 10.3 17 22 30.0 30.0
Norway 24.7 23.7 24.9 -1.2 24.7 23.7 24.9 -1.2 18 24 28.0 28.0
Pakistan 24.1 28.1 22.8 5.3 24.0 28.1 22.8 5.3 19 25 35.0 35.0
Germany 23.8 25.8 23.2 2.6 33.1 35.3 32.4 2.9 20 12 30.2 38.9 -8.7
Peru 23.0 29.8 21.4 8.4 23.0 29.8 21.4 8.4 21 27 30.0 30.0
Bolivia 22.9 30.3 20.5 9.8 22.9 30.3 20.5 9.8 22 29 25.0 25.0
Tunisia 21.9 24.0 21.2 2.8 25.6 28.0 24.8 3.2 23 20 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Portugal 20.8 18.9 21.2 -2.3 19.6 17.7 20.0 -2.3 24 39 29.0 27.5 1.5
Iran 20.6 27.6 18.5 9.1 20.6 27.6 18.5 9.1 25 33 25.0 25.0
Fiji 20.6 25.1 19.4 5.7 23.1 28.0 21.9 6.1 26 26 29.0 31.0 -2.0
Indonesia 20.5 23.9 18.5 5.4 25.0 28.9 22.8 6.1 27 23 25.0 30.0 -5.0
Canada 20.5 11.7 24.0 -12.3 39.0 35.6 41.2 -5.6 28 4 29.3 34.3 -5.0
Kazakhstan 19.9 22.6 19.2 3.4 28.9 32.2 28.2 4.0 29 18 17.5 30.0 -12.5
Tanzania 19.3 15.2 20.1 -4.9 19.3 15.2 20.1 -4.9 30 40 30.0 30.0
Sierra Leone 19.0 14.4 19.8 -5.4 19.0 14.4 19.8 -5.4 31 41 35.0 35.0
Sweden 18.9 17.5 19.3 -1.8 20.3 18.8 20.7 -1.9 32 35 26.3 28.0 -1.7
Georgia 18.9 21.1 18.4 2.7 22.4 25.1 21.8 3.3 33 30 15.0 20.0 -5.0
Denmark 18.5 20.3 18.2 2.1 21.0 22.9 20.6 2.3 34 32 25.0 30.0 -5.0
Finland 18.3 20.2 17.7 2.5 18.3 20.2 17.7 2.5 35 43 26.0 26.0
Malaysia 18.0 19.7 16.9 2.8 20.4 22.3 19.3 3.0 36 34 25.0 28.0 -3.0
Jamaica 17.9 15.9 18.2 -2.3 17.9 15.9 18.2 -2.3 37 45 33.3 33.3
Ecuador 17.9 22.6 16.4 6.2 16.2 20.3 15.0 5.3 38 58 25.0 25.0
Jordan 17.6 13.7 19.0 -5.3 17.6 13.7 19.0 -5.3 39 46 23.2 23.2
Switzerland 17.6 16.8 17.8 -1.0 18.1 17.3 18.3 -1.0 40 44 21.2 21.3 -0.1
New Zealand 17.6 15.5 18.0 -2.5 19.8 17.5 20.3 -2.8 41 38 30.0 33.0 -3.0
Mexico 17.5 19.0 17.1 1.9 17.5 19.0 17.1 1.9 42 47 30.0 30.0
Marginal Effective Tax Rate
2010 2005
Overall Manuf. Services Sectoral Overall Manuf. Services Sectoral 2010 2005 2010 2005 +-% 
gap** gap** point
METR
Ranking In
Descending
Order
Statutory Company
Income Tax Rate
cont’d
TABLE 3: cont’d
* By 2013, Canada’s METR will decline to 18.4 percent, placing it below Denmark. 
** Sectoral gap is the manufacturing METR minus the services METR.
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Zambia 17.2 24.1 16.0 8.1 17.2 24.1 16.0 8.1 43 50 35.0 35.0
Thailand 17.0 20.4 14.3 6.1 17.0 20.4 14.3 6.1 44 52 30.0 30.0
Rwanda 16.9 26.8 15.2 11.6 16.9 26.8 15.2 11.6 45 54 30.0 30.0
Netherlands 16.8 15.6 17.0 -1.4 21.4 20.0 21.6 -1.6 46 31 25.5 31.5 -6.0
Luxembourg 16.8 17.9 16.7 1.2 19.8 21.0 19.7 1.3 47 37 28.6 30.4 -1.8
China 16.6 21.1 15.7 5.4 43.7 47.0 43.0 4.0 48 1 25.0 25.0
Hungary 15.9 17.2 15.6 1.6 14.5 15.6 14.2 1.4 49 64 19.0 16.0 3.0
Uganda 15.4 11.0 16.2 -5.2 15.4 11.0 16.2 -5.2 50 61 30.0 30.0
Nigeria 15.1 20.7 14.2 6.5 14.7 20.2 13.8 6.4 51 63 33.0 32.0 1.0
Madagascar 14.6 19.4 13.2 6.2 20.1 26.1 18.5 7.6 52 36 23.0 30.0 -7.0
Israel 14.6 13.1 15.3 -2.2 18.9 17.2 19.7 -2.5 53 42 0.3 0.3 -0.1
South Africa 14.5 15.6 14.3 1.3 15.9 17.0 15.6 1.4 54 59 28.0 30.0 -2.0
Bangladesh 14.5 12.7 14.9 -2.2 16.3 14.5 16.8 -2.3 55 57 27.5 30.0 -2.5
Poland 14.3 13.4 14.5 -1.1 14.3 13.4 14.5 -1.1 56 66 19.0 19.0
Morocco 13.9 18.7 12.5 6.2 17.2 22.6 15.7 6.9 57 49 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Botswana 13.6 7.9 14.0 -6.1 13.6 7.9 14.0 -6.1 58 68 25.0 25.0
Trinidad 13.1 3.8 16.8 -13.0 16.6 5.9 20.9 -15.0 59 55 25.0 30.0 -5.0
Greece 13.0 12.3 13.1 -0.8 17.4 16.5 17.5 -1.0 60 48 24.0 32.0 -8.0
Ghana 12.9 13.4 12.7 0.7 12.9 13.4 12.7 0.7 61 69 25.0 25.0
Czech Rep 12.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 17.1 17.1 17.1 0.0 62 51 19.0 26.0 -7.0
Vietnam 11.7 19.4 8.9 10.5 13.7 22.2 10.6 11.6 63 67 25.0 28.0 -3.0
Slovenia 11.6 11.7 11.6 0.1 15.1 15.1 15.0 0.1 64 62 20.0 25.0 -5.0
Slovak Republic 11.2 14.2 10.4 3.8 11.2 14.2 10.4 3.8 65 70 19.0 19.0
Ireland 10.9 10.3 11.2 -0.9 10.9 10.3 11.2 -0.9 66 71 12.5 12.5
Taiwan 10.9 13.0 9.9 3.1 16.6 19.5 15.2 4.3 67 56 17.0 25.0 -8.0
Ethiopia 9.8 24.3 6.4 17.9 9.8 24.3 6.4 17.9 68 74 30.0 30.0
Croatia 9.5 11.9 8.4 3.5 9.5 11.9 8.4 3.5 69 75 22.0 22.0
Iceland 8.9 5.9 9.4 -3.5 16.9 14.1 17.5 -3.4 70 53 15.0 18.0 -3.0
Romania 8.6 10.9 7.6 3.3 8.6 10.9 7.6 3.3 71 76 16.0 16.0
Singapore 8.5 6.8 9.9 -3.1 10.3 8.3 11.9 -3.6 72 73 17.0 20.0 -3.0
Mauritius 7.8 8.7 7.5 1.2 14.4 15.9 14.0 1.9 73 65 15.0 25.0 -10.0
Egypt 7.0 9.4 6.2 3.2 15.8 19.9 14.5 5.4 74 60 20.0 34.0 -14.0
Chile 6.7 7.3 6.6 0.7 7.3 7.9 7.2 0.7 75 78 17.0 17.0
Turkey 5.6 4.9 5.8 -0.9 10.7 9.9 11.0 -1.1 76 72 20.0 30.0 -10.0
Latvia 5.6 7.2 5.3 1.9 5.6 7.2 5.3 1.9 77 79 15.0 15.0
Bulgaria 4.6 5.1 4.5 0.6 7.4 8.1 7.2 0.9 78 77 10.0 15.0 -5.0
Kenya 4.5 -35.2 11.7 -46.9 4.5 -35.2 11.7 -46.9 79 80 30.0 30.0
Hong Kong 4.0 3.6 4.1 -0.5 4.3 3.9 4.4 -0.5 80 81 16.5 17.5 -1.0
Ukraine 3.1 11.8 0.1 11.7 3.1 11.8 0.1 11.7 81 82 25.0 25.0
Belgium -1.7 -0.2 -2.0 1.8 23.0 22.0 23.2 -1.2 82 28 34.0 34.0
Serbia -5.1 -11.4 -2.5 -8.9 -5.1 -11.4 -2.5 -8.9 83 83 10.0 10.0
AVERAGE 17.7 18.2 17.5 0.7 20.4 21.0 20.2 0.8 25.3 27.7 -2.4
Marginal Effective Tax Rate
2010 2005
Overall Manuf. Services Sectoral Overall Manuf. Services Sectoral 2010 2005 2010 2005 +-% 
gap** gap** point
METR
Ranking In
Descending
Order
Statutory Company
Income Tax Rate
As a result, Canada’s tax competitiveness ranking has significantly improved by various
measures. Canada has gone from the highest taxed to the lowest among the G-7 countries, from
the highest taxed to the 13th highest within OECD countries and from the fourth highest taxed
to the 28th highest among all 83 countries studied.  
Largely as a result of Canada’s accomplishment in advancing its tax competitiveness, the
average METR for the G-7 countries has dropped more than five percentage points from
34 percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2010. Other G-7 members that also improved their tax
competitiveness in this period include Germany (with a METR reduction of nine percentage
points), Italy (five percentage points), the United Kingdom (1.5 percentage points) and France
(one percentage point). 
The US has made little progress with its slightly lowered company income tax rate only for
domestic productive activities and a temporary 50 percent bonus depreciation allowance
providing for the expensing of machinery capital in 201114. Temporary measures, however, do
not result in a sustained increase in capital stock held by businesses. Rather, temporary
accelerated depreciation primarily pushes investment from the future to the period when the
incentive is available. Our METR evaluation excludes such temporary measures because
potential investors view the predictable long-term tax provisions critical for long-term
investment planning.  
Other countries that advanced their tax competitiveness at a pace comparable to Canada’s
(i.e., lowered their METR by nearly half or more over the past five years) include China,
Egypt, Mauritius and Turkey. Many developed countries that have always been more tax-
competitive than Canada have continued to reduce corporate taxes, including Hong Kong
(China), Singapore, Taiwan, Israel, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Slovenia and New Zealand, to name a few. It is obvious that tax competitiveness is a moving
target, making reform an ongoing task for all nations. 
INTER-INDUSTRY TAX BURDENS: AN IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF TAX
COMPETITIVENESS 
We believe tax competitiveness must be improved for all industries in Canada, rather than only
for a few selected by the government such as manufacturing. Our ranking for both the
manufacturing and service sectors shows that, despite the recent advance in its overall tax
competitiveness, Canada does not fair well in the tax competitiveness of its service sectors.
Ranked by the METR for the services sector, Canada is the 19th highest country among all
83 countries studied despite the fact that Canadian manufacturing industry is only the 66th
highest taxed among the 83 countries. In other words, Canada has the second-highest METR
ranking gap between manufacturing and services among all 83 countries (Table 4).
14 Internal Revenue Service website, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=233907,00.html
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TABLE 4: Canada’s Ranking: Inter-Industry Tax Differences 2010* 
* Refer to Table 3 for METR by sector. The ranking gap is the difference between the rank for services minus the rank for
manufacturing. 
Tax preferences or targeted tax reliefs are not uncommon in many tax regimes around the
globe. For business taxation, the most-used tax reliefs include – but are not limited to –
accelerated depreciation allowances and investment tax credits. For example, New Zealand in
the past provided a 20 percent investment allowance for new plant and equipment (this
allowance was eliminated in its 2010 budget). The US government also introduced a temporary
50 percent bonus depreciation allowance in 2008 and 2009 for fixed capital assets with certain
lengths of useful lives (with 100 percent investment allowance available in 2011). But these tax
reliefs were provided across all business sectors in both countries.  
What is unusual about the use of tax reliefs in Canada is that they are almost always narrowly
targeted at the manufacturing and processing sectors as well as resource sectors such as
agriculture, fishing, forestry and extractive industries.15 Such tax relief directed only at the
resource and manufacturing sectors includes the federal Atlantic Investment Tax Credit,
repeatedly extended temporary fast write-offs for machinery and equipment, several provincial
investment tax credits and the reduced corporate income tax rate for manufacturing income in a
few provinces.  
For the manufacturing and service industries, the combined result of all these targeted tax
reliefs is a sectoral METR ranking gap that is the widest among OECD countries, indicating
that Canada is the most active user of tax measures in support of so-called industrial policy
among the developed countries.  
15 Our international comparisons do not include agriculture, fishing and extractive industries.
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A. Canada’s ranking by METR, by sector, in descending order 
G7 7 7 6
OECD 13 28 11
ALL 83 COUNTRIES 28 66 19
B. METR ranking gap between manufacturing and services: The top ten countries in descending order
Ethiopia 51
Canada 47
Lesotho 45
Trinidad 36
Rwanda 33
Vietnam 32
Tanzania 25
Sierra Leone 25
Nigeria 23
Jordan 23
Overall Manufacturing Services
Only Ethiopia has a wider METR ranking gap between manufacturing and services sectors
than Canada. Other countries occupying the top ten spots with the widest METR ranking gap
between sectors are Lesotho, Trinidad, Rwanda, Vietnam, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and
Jordan. Among these nine countries, five have a tax structure favouring manufacturing
industry.  
For example, Lesotho and Jordan have a reduced tax rate for manufacturing (ten and
15 percent respectively versus 25 percent for non-manufacturing sectors) while Tanzania
and Trinidad provide substantial initial allowances for manufacturing investment (40 and
60 percent respectively). Sierra Leone also favours manufacturing industry with a very
generous depreciation allowance. Among the other four countries in the top ten, all seem to
favour the service sector more than manufacturing. However, the METR ranking gaps in these
four countries are more attributable to their high inflation rates (e.g., 20 percent in Ethiopia,
11 percent in Rwanda and Vietnam, and nine percent in Nigeria)16.
An obvious question arising from the above cross-border comparison of the sectoral METR
dispersion is whether Canada’s use of business tax relief justifies tax policy as a tool of
industrial policy. Regardless of the answer, we have an urgent need to catch up with the
international trend in tax design that favours broad bases and low rates for all taxpayers. 
As discussed above, low rates encourage investment but also help reduce tax avoidance,
generating revenues for governments. Reducing inter-sector differences in tax burdens
improves the allocation of resources in the economy, maximizes output and reduces both
administrative costs for governments and compliance costs for taxpayers. To accomplish this,
the first step might be to evaluate whether our sector-oriented tax relief package, including
various investment tax credits and fast write-offs, has accomplished anything on a cost-benefit
basis17. 
LOOKING BEYOND 2013 
Assuming all the tax changes announced in government budgets materialize, Canada’s overall
METR will drop to 18.4 percent in 2013 and the METRs for manufacturing and a broad range
of service sectors will be 13.8 percent and 20.5 percent respectively.18 As a result, Canada’s
inter-sector METR gap will drop. Despite such a significant improvement, however, Canada’s
business tax system will still have the greatest gap between manufacturing and services sectors
among OECD countries.  
16 Capital assets with longer useful lives (e.g., buildings) are usually given a lower tax depreciation allowance than
those with shorter useful lives (e.g., machinery and equipment). Inflation discounts the value of tax benefits
generated from tax depreciation allowances. For a given high inflation rate, the higher the tax depreciation
allowance, the greater the loss of tax benefit due to the discounting effect of inflation.  Since, compared to service
sectors (which use more buildings and structures), manufacturing industry generally uses capital assets with a shorter
lifespan that are hence entitled to a higher tax depreciation allowance, a high inflation rate harms manufacturing
industry more than it does service sectors. Other things being equal, a high inflation rate may cause a METR for
manufacturing to be higher than that for service sectors.
17 OECD, “Executive Summary”, in OECD, Choosing a Broad Base - Low Rate Approach to Taxation, 28 Oct 2010.
18 Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz, “Federal-Provincial Business Tax Reforms: A Growth Agenda with Competitive Rates
and Neutral Treatment of Business Activities,” SPP Research Papers, Volume 4, Issue 1, School of Public Policy,
University of Calgary, January 2011.
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Other OECD countries that have planned or proposed further reduction in company income tax
rates include Israel (which plans to reduce the rate annually until it reaches 18 percent by
2016), Australia (reducing the tax rate by one percentage point in 2013-4), New Zealand
(two points by 2011 with base-broadening measures), Greece (four points by 2014), Japan (by
five points proposed to come into effect April 1, 2011) and the UK (decline to 24 percent by
2014)19. Incorporating all these tax cuts and the lower US federal company income tax rate of
26 percent (the mid-point of the corporate rates as proposed by the Presidential Deficit
Commission), the average of effective tax rates will be 26 percent within the G-7, 18 percent
for the OECD members and 17.4 percent for all 83 studied. Canada’s METR in 2013 will still
be somewhat above the OECD average.  
More fundamentally, signs of sweeping tax reforms are gathering momentum in major
industrial countries such as Australia, the UK and the US20. In fact, the UK government has
already set out a timetable for corporate tax reform aimed at delivering a more competitive tax
system21. If these well-designed or hotly debated reform proposals do materialize, they will
certainly lead to a new international business taxation norm that embraces many seemingly
radical tax ideas. Canada, despite having earned the top ranking in tax competitiveness among
G-7 countries, may not have much time to wait before responding to these new challenges.
APPENDIX 
The estimates of effective tax rates on new investment in this report are based on a
methodology summarized in Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz, “Taxing Business Investments:
A New Ranking of Effective Tax Rates on Capital,” World Bank, 2008. Our model assumes
a multinational company seeking to maximize value for its projects around the world, raising
equity and debt financing from international markets. The company minimizes its cost of
finance by choosing an optimal debt and dividend policy, taking into account tax and non-tax
factors that influence financial decisions (independent of the investment decision). The cost of
equity and debt is determined by international markets independent of the availability of
domestic savings in a small open economy. Therefore, personal income taxes on dividends,
interest and capital gains do not affect the multinational’s cost of financing even though those
personal taxes do effect personal savings decisions.  
19 Tax Notes International, various issues, up to January 10, 2011. 
20 Contributing ideas for these possible tax reforms may be found in, but are not limited to, Australia’s Future Tax
System Review, also referred as The Henry Review, available at
http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_reports.htm;
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010, Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review, available at www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview
(2010)); and The National Commission for Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, “The Moment of Truth,” December
2010,
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. 
21 HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs, 2010, “Corporate Tax Reform: Delivering a More Competitive
System,” November 29, available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/corporate_tax_reform_complete_document.pdf.
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To calculate the effective tax rate on new investments, similar investment projects in
manufacturing and service industries are assumed in each country. The same capital structure
for eight industries (manufacturing, construction, utilities, communications, transport,
wholesale trade, retail trade and other services) is assumed across countries, using data for
capital stock weights developed by Finance Canada. We also use Statistics Canada’s recently
estimated economic depreciation rates and apply them across all countries. We account for
corporate income tax rates, tax depreciation, inventory cost deductions, sales taxes on capital
inputs and capital-related taxes such as financial transaction taxes, equity contribution taxes
and asset-based taxes. Due to lack of data or  limited application, property taxes, export
development zones and tax holidays are not included in the analysis.
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